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INTRODUCTION
The testimony of Aris Vision Institute, Inc.'s ("Aris") own employees at trial
proved conclusively that Aris vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002, terminated all
business operations in Utah as well as throughout the country on that date, wrongfully
turned possession over to the doctors on January 7 and failed to pay the January rent. The
judgment entered in error by the trial court not only absolved Aris from any liability for
abandoning the Premises and turning possession over to the doctors in breach of the
Lease, but imposed hundreds of thousands of dollars in trebled damages against Wasatch
Property Management, Inc. ("Wasatch") and JDJ Properties, Inc. ("JDJ") for not turning
possession of the equipment and furniture (the "Equipment") over to Aris sooner. The
trial court reached this incredible result even though Aris was voluntarily cooperating
with Wasatch and JDJ to relet the Premises and sell the Equipment for a number of
months in order to mitigate Aris's liability for damages.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment is erroneous as a matter of law and
should be reversed. JDJ is entitled to recover on its Counterclaim for lost rents. Wasatch
and JDJ are not liable for treble damages for forcible detainer or for wrongful eviction or
even for conversion of the Equipment. Finally, the amount of damages awarded by the
trial court is clearly erroneous.

ARGUMENT
A. WASATCH AND JDJ HAVE FULLY COMPLIED WITH THEIR
OBLIGATION TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Aris attempts to short circuit the arguments asserted by Wasatch and JDJ by
erroneously contending - - and repeating throughout its brief- - that Wasatch and JDJ
have failed to comply with their obligation to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's decision. [Appellee's Brief at 14-15]
This argument is surprising given the fact that Wasatch and JDJ have devoted a
large portion of their brief to marshaling the evidence presented by Aris in the trial court
and the facts to which the parties stipulated below and have based their arguments on that
marshaled evidence. [See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 6-23]
In this regard, there is a glaring omission from Aris's brief. Aris does not point out
to the court any evidence that Wasatch and JDJ supposedly failed to marshal that supports
the trial court's decision. This omission is understandable given the fact that all of the
evidence recited by Aris in its Statement of Facts is included in the Statement of Facts
contained in Appellant's Brief. Indeed, in their brief, Wasatch and JDJ have recited the
evidence relied upon by Aris in more detail than Aris itself presents the evidence in its
brief. Importantly, the arguments made by Wasatch and JDJ are based entirely on Aris's
evidence, the stipulated facts and the trial court's findings with the limited exception of
JDJ's undisputed testimony concerning the re-letting of the Premises and lost rents. That
is no doubt why Aris has not challenged a single piece of evidence cited in Appellants'
2

Brief or asserted in Aris's Statement of Facts a single fact not contained in Appellants'
Brief
Aris's marshaling argument is devoid of merit, and should be rejected.
B. ARIS ABANDONED THE PREMISES WITHOUT PAYING RENT AND
WRONGFULLY TURNED OVER POSSESSION TO THE DOCTORS.
Wasatch and JDJ demonstrated in Appellants' Brief that without any notice Aris
abruptly terminated all of its business on the premises leased from JDJ (the "Premises")
on January 4, 2002, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor
doctors on January 7 and failed to pay rent within 15 days of the due date. Aris does not
and cannot dispute these facts, which were established by the testimony of its own
employees. Thus, under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.3, Aris is presumed to have
abandoned the Premises in breach of paragraph 18.1(d) of the Lease [Pi's Ex. 9], and is
liable for damages. The arguments raised by Aris in its brief are insufficient to defeat this
claim.
1. Abandonment Was Raised Below.
Aris attempts to sidestep the abandonment argument by incorrectly asserting that
Wasatch and JDJ failed below to raise the argument that Aris abandoned the Premises on
January 4, 2002. [Appellee's Brief at 17] This argument is belied by the record. In the
court below, Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly argued that Aris either abandoned the Premises
on January 4 or at least by February 9 when the doctors vacated. For example:
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(a) In the Pretrial Order, Wasatch and JDJ contended that Aris unilaterally
terminated the Lease on January 4 and that Aris had abandoned the Premises more than
five days prior to January 22, 2002, which was the date on which Aris contended the
forcible detainer occurred. [R. 169-170 & 176]
(b) In their Trial Brief, Wasatch and JDJ argued that Aris shut down its office and
terminated all of its employees on or about January 4, 2002, allowed the doctors to take
possession of the Premises and then negotiated with the doctors to attempt to transfer the
Lease and Equipment to the doctors and that Aris failed to pay the January rent. [R. 219]
Wasatch and JDJ argued that Aris's own testimony demonstrated that the doctors - - not
Aris - - were in possession of the Premises on January 22, 2002 and that since Aris had
terminated all its employees on January 4, 2002, Aris was not in possession after that
date. Wasatch and JDJ concluded that "if the tenant has abandoned or surrendered
possession of the premises there can be no claim of forcible detainer." [R. 230-231]
(c) In closing argument before Judge Lewis, Wasatch and JDJ again argued that
Aris abandoned the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its employees and closed its
offices. [R. 529 at 558-559 & 577; R. 305]
Moreover, the testimony of Aris's own witnesses at trial establishes that Wasatch
and JDJ have always claimed Aris abandoned the Premises prior to January 22, 2002,
when Aris's Richard Enright ("Enright") came to Salt Lake to attempt to remove the
Equipment. Enright testified that Wasatch's property manager, Dennis Peacock

4

("Peacock"), refused to accept a check for rent on January 22, stating that it was too late
because Aris had abandoned the Premises, that Wasatch was not taking Aris's money and
that Wasatch had seized the Equipment. [R. 526 at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 27]
Likewise, Aris's Kathleen Soto ("Soto") testified that on that same day Peacock told her
Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease and that as a result
Wasatch was entitled to seize Aris's personal property. [R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29]
Clearly, Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly raised the January 4 abandonment argument
below, and did not waive that argument.
2. Aris Breached the Lease by Giving Possession to the Doctors.
Aris also mistakenly contends that Wasatch and JDJ waived the argument that Aris
breached the Lease by "subletting" the Premises to the doctors. [Appellee's Brief at 18]
Initially, Wasatch and JDJ do not contend that the Premises were "sublet," but instead
argue that possession of the Premises was wrongfully turned over to the doctors while
Aris unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a sublease or assignment with the doctors. As
demonstrated above, Wasatch and JDJ argued that Aris abandoned the Premises on
January 4 and turned over possession to the doctors and Aris's own witnesses testified to
these facts. [R. 527 at 235-237; R. 296-297]1
1

In any event, even if it were assumed that this argument was not raised in the trial court,
whether Aris's admitted conduct in turning over possession of the Premises to the doctors
constituted a breach of the Lease is purely a question of law that could be raised for the first time
on appeal. See cased cited at p. 15, infra.
5

Aris next argues that there was no breach of the Lease because the trial court found
that Aris never entered into a sublease or assignment of the Lease with the doctors, but
was only negotiating an assignment. [Appellee's Brief at 18-19] This argument too
narrowly construes the Lease. Paragraph 11.1 of the Lease prohibited Aris from
assigning or subletting or allowing any other person to use or occupy the Premises
without JDJys prior written consent.2 [Pi's Ex. 9]
Aris also argues that JDJ "acquiesced" in the doctors remaining in the Premises by
proposing to work out a business solution after January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 19] The
fact that Wasatch and JDJ allowed the doctors to remain in possession of the Premises
after Aris had already breached the Lease by abandoning the Premises and turning
possession over to the doctors weeks earlier, and while the parties were attempting to
negotiate an agreement for the doctors to assume the Lease, did not somehow waive
Aris's breach of the Lease and the trial court did not so find. In fact, Section 11.4 of the
Lease provided that in the event Aris allowed a third party to occupy the Premises, JDJ
could even collect rent from the third party without waiving the necessity for Aris to
obtain JDJ's consent to the assignment, subletting or transfer of possession. [Pi's Ex. 9]

2

Aris tells the court that unknown to Aris, as of January 1, 2002, the doctors had entered
into a Lease Agreement with JDJ for new space so they were not even potential subtenants with
respect to the Premises. [Appellee's Brief at 19] This argument is incorrect. The Lease with the
doctors was entered into some time after January 22, but provided it was effective as of January
1. [R. 527 at 307-308] In fact, it was undisputed that Aris and the doctors continued negotiating
for Aris to take over the Lease into February. [R. 527 at 219-220] In this regard, Aris's Soto
testified that Skalka told her prior to January 22 that the doctors were looking at new space. [R.
527 at 239]
6

3. The Evidence Establishes Abandonment as a Matter of Law.
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the evidence supporting
the trial court's finding that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to January 22, and
therefore it must be taken as established that Aris did not vacate. Once more, Aris is
content to state this mere conclusion without telling the Court what supposed evidence
was not marshaled. As discussed earlier, Wasatch and JDJ have indeed marshaled the
evidence. Further, Aris's argument ignores the uncontroverted testimony of its own
witnesses that Aris ceased all operations and terminated all its employees on January 4
and turned over possession to the doctors on January 7 without paying the January rent.
Aris also contends that the ruling on abandonment should be upheld because
Wasatch and JDJ have failed to challenge the trial court's finding that Aris never intended
to surrender the Premises. Aris argues that absent an intent to surrender there can be no
abandonment. [Appellee's Brief at 21] This argument fails because surrender and
abandonment are two different legal principles. See Thomas & Backman on Utah Real
Property Law, §5.03(e) at 197 (1999). Most importantly, Aris's intent to surrender (or
abandon) is irrelevant to presumed abandonment under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.3,
which only requires the tenant's failure to notify the owner that the tenant will be absent
from the premises, failure to pay rent within 15 days and lack of reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the
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premises. Aris introduced no such evidence. Aris could not do so because the doctors
were occupying the Premises and conducting their own business. 3
All of the evidence upon which Wasatch's andJDJ's

abandonment argument is

based comes from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses. Aris does not challenge any of
that evidence - - or point to any contrary or additional evidence - - but only argues about
the legal conclusion of abandonment. Aris's position is without merit because the law is
clear that Aris's act in vacating the Premises on January 4, turning over possession of the
Premises to the doctors by January 7 and failing to pay the January rent constituted an
abandonment and a breach of the Lease. JDJ was, therefore, entitled to recover damages
on its Counterclaim together with attorneys fees and costs incurred below and on appeal.
C. ARIS IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER FOR FORCIBLE DETAINER
OR WRONGFUL EVICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Aris raises a number of arguments to attempt to convince the court that Judge
Lewis properly entered judgment for treble damages on the forcible detainer claim and a
judgment for wrongful eviction. As will now be demonstrated, these arguments are not
supported by the evidence or the applicable law.

3

Aris also argues that presumed abandonment under §78-36-12.3 does not apply because
Judge Lewis found that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to January 22. [Appellee's Brief at
22] However, as demonstrated above, the undisputed evidence establishes that Aris vacated and
abandoned the Premises on January 4.
8

1. Forcible Detainer.
After Aris ceased all business operations, terminated all employees and vacated the
Premises on January 4 and voluntarily turned over possession of the Premises to the
doctors on January 7, Aris had no reason or desire to occupy the Premises and had no
ability to do so.

Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do

so by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible detainer
statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the withholding of personal
property. 4 Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2. See Freeway ParkBldg., Inc. v. Western States
Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969).
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965), for the proposition that a landlord can
be held liable under the forcible detainer statute for seizing a tenant's personal property
without judicial process. [Appellee's Brief at 31] These cases are not on point because
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord also refused to
permit the tenant to remove personal property. Further, the Supreme Court only
recognized that the tenants had causes of action for conversion of the personal property.
The Supreme Court did not hold or intimate in either case that treble damages can be
awarded against a landlord for conversion of the tenant's personal property.

4

Aris does not appear to challenge that Wasatch and JDJ raised below the argument that
the forcible detainer statute only applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not personal
property. In any event, they clearly did raise this argument. [See, e.g., R. 401-402 ^[a, c & e;
175-176; 230-231; 305-306; R. 529 at 560-561; 403 |5]
9

a. Aris Did Not Meet the Five Day Possession Requirement.
Aris contends that it satisfied the requirement that it be in possession of the
Premises for five days prior to the alleged forcible detainer because the trial court found
that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 25] Aris is
forced to again ignore the undisputed testimony of its own witnesses discussed above
which demonstrates that this finding is clearly erroneous because Aris vacated on January
4 and turned over possession to the doctors on January 7.
Aris also argues that the five day requirement is not applicable because Aris says it
relies on subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2, and the five day requirement is
contained in subsection (2). [Appellee's Brief at 25] Subsection (1) is inapplicable,
however, because Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep possession of the
Premises or do so by force, as will be demonstrated below. Moreover, even under
subsection (1) possession by the tenant at the time of the forcible detainer is required.
Aris did not meet that requirement because it was not in possession of the Premises on
January 22 or thereafter.
b. The Doctors Were in Possession of the Premises as of January 22, So There
Could Have Been No Forcible Detainer on That Date.
Aris erroneously takes the position that the fact that the doctors were in possession
of the Premises on January 22 is irrelevant to the forcible detainer claim because: (1)
Wasatch and JDJ did not argue below that Aris had sublet the Premises to the doctors; (2)
Skalka supposedly only refused to release the Equipment based on Peacock's directive
10

and; (3) because from February 9 onward the Premises were solely within the control of
Wasatch and JDJ.
Again, Wasatch and JDJ do not argue that Aris had "sublet" the Premises to the
doctors, but instead argue that Aris had wrongfully given possession of the Premises to
the doctors. As demonstrated earlier (pp. 4-6), this argument was in fact raised below.
Wasatch and JDJ also raised the argument that Aris was not entitled to use self-help
against the doctors on January 22 to recover the Equipment. [See, e.g., R. 220-221, f 10;
R. 222, Tfl6; R. 230; R. 289, 202; R. 305] Further, there was no testimony that Skalka
would have turned over the Equipment the doctors were using for their surgeries that had
been scheduled for January 22 and for weeks thereafter if Peacock would have agreed.
Because the doctors - - not Aris - - were in possession of the Premises on January
22 and Aris did not even seek possession of the Premises, there could have been no
forcible detainer on that date. Indeed, Enright was given access to the Premises by Skalka
on January 22. All Wasatch's Peacock did was to refuse to agree that Enright could
remove the Equipment. Wasatch and JDJ did not wrongfully withhold the Equipment that
was in the possession of the doctors on that date, but even if it is assumed they did so, that
would not have constituted a forcible detainer of real property.
c. Wasatch and JDJ Did Not Hold the Property by Force.
Aris contends that Wasatch held the Premises "by force" by two acts. First,
Peacock told Enright on January 22 that he could not take the Equipment. Second,
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Peacock later changed the locks sometime after the doctors vacated on February 9 and
then again in June based on the Salt Lake County seizure notice and because of the
purported "ongoing refusal to give Aris free and unfettered access to the Premises .. . ."
[Appellee's Brief at 26] The record simply does not support any conclusion that Wasatch
and JDJ held the Premises by force.
There was absolutely no evidence that when Enright attempted to remove the
Equipment on January 22 Peacock took any physical action to prevent Enright from doing
so. Peacock simply told Enright that because Aris had abandoned the Premises, Wasatch
had seized the Equipment. Peacock did not threaten to harm Enright. [R. 526 at 103]
Enright himself testified that he did not have a confrontation with Peacock on January 22,
but "basically a discussion". [R. 526 at 76-77]
Likewise, Peacock's changing of the locks occurred sometime after February 9,
more than five weeks after Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises. Aris does not
dispute that the changing of the locks had no effect whatsoever on its ability to access the
Premises because Aris did not have keys to the Premises before the locks were changed.
The only effect that changing the locks had was to prevent the doctors and the fired
employees from entering the Premises after they vacated on February 9. Aris also does
not deny that it never attempted to occupy the Premises, never requested occupancy of the
Premises after the locks were changed and that it never even requested keys. cf. Frisco
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Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1977) (In rejecting claim for forcible entry,
Court noted that tenants knew locks had been changed, but did not request new keys).
Finally, Aris does not dispute that after January 22 it only requested (and was
given) access for the purpose of inspecting the Equipment and showing the Premises and
Equipment to prospective purchasers. Indeed, on June 4, Olson wrote Dahlstrom
confirming their "several" telephone conversations that the parties were working together
to find a new tenant and that "[i]n the meantime, Aris will leave its valuable equipment in
the space." [R. 526 at 173 & Pi's Ex. 24]
d. JDJ Had the Contractual Right to Retain Possession of the Equipment.
Aris does not deny that paragraph 20.1 of the Lease gave JDJ the right to retain the
Equipment in the event of abandonment of the Premises, or challenge the authorities cited
in Appellants' Brief holding that the provision is enforceable.5 Instead, Aris first claims
that this argument was not preserved below. However, Aris's own witnesses, Enright and
Soto, specifically testified that when Aris wanted to remove the Equipment on January
22, Wasatch's Peacock told them that based on Aris's abandonment of the Premises

5

Aris cites Pentecost v. Harward, supra, apparently for the proposition that contractual
provisions purporting to authorize self-help are void as against public policy. [Appellee's Brief at
27] Pentecost is easily distinguished. In that case, the apartment manager forcibly evicted the
tenant and her children from the premises and refused to allow them to take their furniture. The
manager did so "without contractual or judicial sanction". In the case at bar, Aris had already
abandoned the Premises weeks earlier and had left the Equipment on the Premises. Thus,
Wasatch and JDJ did not resort to "self-help", but simply exercised JDJ's contractual right under
paragraph 20.1 of the Lease, as well as its statutory lessor's lien rights under Utah Code Ann.,
§38-3-1, to retain possession of the Equipment.
13

Wasatch had seized the Equipment under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease. [R. 526 at 42-43;
R. 527 at 247] Soto responded by claiming to Peacock that under paragraph 20.1 Aris had
the right to remove its Equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 247] Olson
also testified that Dahlstrom told him Aris could not expect Wasatch to just let all the
security (the Equipment) walk out the door, leaving Wasatch holding the bag. [R. 526 at
160-161]6
Aris next asserts that it had not abandoned the Premises so paragraph 20.1 did not
apply. The undisputed evidence, however, demonstrates that Aris had indeed abandoned
the Premises on January 4 when it fired all of its Utah employees, terminated its
operations and then turned over the Premises to the doctors.
e. JDJ's Lessor's Lien Remained Effective for 30 Days After Abandonment.
Aris argues that the court should not consider the lessor's lien argument asserted
by JDJ and Wasatch because they admit it was not raised below. However, the
undisputed testimony of Aris5s own witnesses was that Wasatch and JDJ told Aris on
January 22 that Aris could not take the Equipment because it had been seized based on
Aris's abandonment of the Premises and non-payment of rent and that JDJ's general
counsel claimed to Aris's counsel that the Equipment was security for the unpaid rents.
[R. 526 at 44-45 & 160-161; R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29] Thus, the existence and

6

Moreover, even if it were wrongly assumed this issue was not raised below, the
enforceability of this contractual provision based on undisputed facts raises a pure question of
law that could be raised for the first time on appeal. See cases cited at p. 15, infra.
14

scope of a lessor's lien giving JDJ a statutory basis for its position the Equipment was
security for rents under the Lease is purely a question of law. See Chase Manhattan Bank
v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9 1J6, 89 P.3d 109, 110 (Utah 2004). See also
Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So.2d 1024, 1028 (Miss. 1991) (scope of
landlord's lien presents a question of law). This issue can, therefore, be raised for the
first time on appeal. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994).
Aris next contends that the lessor's lien should be rejected because the lien is only
for rent due and Aris tendered past due rent on January 22. Aris does not dispute,
however, that it failed to pay the rent when due on January 1, 2002. The lien attached at
that time before Aris tendered a portion of the rent due on January 22. The rent tendered
by Enright on January 22 admittedly did not include the required interest and late payment
fee.7 [R. 527 at 262]
Most importantly, by January 22, Aris had abandoned the Premises and turned
over possession to the doctors in breach of the Lease. Aris was therefore liable for the
difference between the rent accruing during the time necessary for JDJ to relet the
Premises and for the difference between the fair rental value and the rent agreed to by

7

Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ did not raise at trial the fact that the check tendered
by Enright for the January rent did not include any amount for a late payment fee or interest.
[Appellee's Brief at 17-18] However, Wasatch and JDJ argued repeatedly that no valid tender
was made. [See, e.g., R. 221 Tfl5; 223 f20 & 299] Counsel for Wasatch and JDJ also specifically
elicited testimony from Soto that the check tendered for the January rent did not include the
required late payment fee. [R. 527 at 262] It is purely a matter of law that a valid tender must
include the entire amount due. See Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1997). It
was Aris's burden to prove a valid tender.
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Aris during the remaining 4-1/2 years of the Lease plus a reasonable commission for
renting the Premises. Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.6(1). The fair rental at the time was far
less than the rent Aris had agreed to pay. [R. 528 at 387-390; Pi's Ex. 64 at 6-12]
Although Wasatch and JDJ have been unable to find any case law on point, it is
respectfully submitted that the court should reject the notion that a tenant having a longterm lease who abandons the premises years before expiration of the lease can avoid a
lessor's lien for rent due for the remainder of the lease by tendering rent for one month
and then removing the tenant's property from the premises. Such a rule would
emasculate the lessor's lien statute.
The court should also reject Aris's argument that JDJ was required to perfect its
lessor's lien by filing suit and obtaining a writ of attachment and that JDJ failed to do so.
Under §38-3-1, JDJ had a lessor's lien during the time Aris occupied the Premises and for
30 days thereafter without the necessity to file suit and obtain a writ of attachment.
Citizens Bank v. Elks Building NV} 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983); Eason v. Wheelock, 120
P.2d 319, 320 (Utah 1941). Therefore, JDJ had a lessor's lien on the Equipment that did
not expire until at least February 4, 2002, and was in existence as of January 22, when
Aris wanted to remove its Equipment.
f. Aris Had No Right to Recover for Forcible Detainer Because it Was Not
Seeking Restitution of the Premises.
Wasatch and JDJ argued in their brief that the forcible detainer statute is also
inapplicable to Aris's claims because Aris understandably did not seek restitution of real
16

property in this case. Aris responds by arguing that the restitution argument was an
affirmative defense that was waived because it was not raised in a timely fashion. The
cases cited by Aris did not involve the issue of whether restitution is an affirmative
defense, and do not support that position. Aris was required to prove compliance with the
forcible detainer statute and that the statute is applicable to the facts of this action as part
of its case. Because Aris did not seek restitution of real property or damages for being
deprived of occupancy of real property, Aris failed to meet its burden of proof.
Aris argues in this regard that it was entitled to elect to recover damages for the
alleged forcible detainer rather the remedy of restitution. This argument does not assist
Aris because it did not seek damages for any forcible detainer of real property. Aris could
not have proven any such damages because it vacated and abandoned the Premises on
January 4, had no use for the Premises and did not want to occupy the Premises. Instead,
Aris sought and recovered damages for the alleged wrongful withholding (conversion) of
its Equipment. Treble damages under the forcible detainer statute are not recoverable for
the alleged conversion of personal property.
g. The Lock Changes Are Irrelevant
Aris argues that when Wasatch changed the locks after the doctors vacated on
February 9, 2002 (five weeks after Aris vacated), and again in June 2002 as instructed by

Aris's familiar argument that Wasatch and JDJ did not raise the restitution argument
below is simply wrong. The argument was raised repeatedly. [See, e.g., R. 176 & 401 ^fa]
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Salt Lake County in the tax seizure notice, Wasatch and JDJ thereby used force in
detaining the Premises because the lock changes denied Aris free access to the Premises.
For all the reasons stated above (pp. 12-13), the lock changes are irrelevant and certainly
did not constitute the use of "force."
2. Wrongful Eviction.
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ wrongfully evicted Aris from the Premises by
two acts: (1) by supposedly excluding Enright from the Premises on January 22, 2002;
and (2) by changing the locks without providing Aris a key. Wasatch and JDJ have
already fully responded to these arguments in the forcible detainer discussion above, and
will not repeat that discussion. For all the reasons discussed above - - including the fact
that Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises on January 4 and did not want to
occupy the Premises, but at most only wanted to remove its Equipment - - the wrongful
eviction judgment cannot stand.
D. WASATCH AND JDJ DID NOT CONVERT THE EQUIPMENT.
Aris does not challenge any of the evidence relied upon by Wasatch and JDJ for
their argument they did not convert the Equipment, which once more consists of the
testimony of Aris's own witnesses. Instead, Aris simply argues in conclusory fashion that
Wasatch and JDJ have ignored the trial court's findings. That claim is incorrect.
Wasatch and JDJ have marshaled the evidence and demonstrated based upon
Aris's own evidence that when Enright attempted to take possession of the Equipment on
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January 22, 2002 Aris had abandoned the Premises and JDJ therefore had the contractual
right under Paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to retain and dispose of the Equipment and that
JDJ also had a lessor's lien on the Equipment as of January 22. Further, Wasatch and JDJ
had no obligation or right to allow Aris to take the Equipment then in possession of the
doctors. Wasatch and JDJ also demonstrated based on Aris's own evidence that after
January 22, with two irrelevant exceptions,9 Aris made no demand for possession of the
Equipment, but only wanted access to the Premises for the purpose of inspecting and
inventorying the Equipment and showing it to prospective purchasers, and that Wasatch
gave Aris access to the Equipment each time a request was made.
Aris argues in this regard that by January 22, Wasatch and JDJ knew that Aris
wanted its Equipment, but from that date until July 2 when the Equipment was removed
refused "repeated requests by Aris representatives for permission to remove Aris's
property", quoting Finding No. 86. [Appellee's Brief at 38] Tellingly, Aris has not cited
the court to any evidence to support the argument that Wasatch refused "repeated
requests" to remove the Equipment after January 22. There is no such evidence. The true
facts from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses are that Aris understood the Equipment
had much more value in place than if removed and that the parties were cooperating for
months to attempt to relet the Premises and sell the Equipment from the Premises before
9

The two exceptions are that Aris asked to remove a microkeratome from the Premises
and was allowed to do so [R. 526 at 62] and that Aris was delayed from taking the Equipment
sold to Barber from June 10 until June 25. However, this short delay did not cause any damage
because the price Barber paid remained the same. [R. 527 at 175-177, 264 & 266-267]
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Axis made demand in June 2002 to remove the Equipment and was permitted to do so.
[See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 11-15]
Finally, Aris contends that Wasatch and JDJ did not assert waiver below, that they
have failed to marshal the evidence with respect to waiver and that in any event Aris did
not intend to waive any claims by leaving the Equipment on the Premises. All of these
arguments are without merit.
Wasatch and JDJ asserted waiver as an affirmative defense in their Answer. [R.
108] Wasatch and JDJ argued at trial - - and the evidence demonstrated - - that Aris had
left the Equipment on the Premises for months and the parties cooperated in attempting to
relet the Premises and sell the Equipment and that Aris waived any right to claim
damages. [See, e.g., R. 224-225, 232 & 288] The fact that (as Wasatch and JDJ recited in
Appellants' Brief) the trial court found that Aris did not intend to waive its rights by
leaving the Equipment on the Premises is irrelevant to the waiver argument. Waiver is
based upon Aris's objective intent, not its secret subjective intent. [See cases cited in
Appellants' Brief at 39] Aris objectively manifested its intent to waive any conversion
claim by cooperating for months to relet the Premises and sell the Equipment from the
Premises to maximize the amount that could be obtained from the sale of the Equipment
in order to mitigate Aris's liability for damages for breach of the Lease, and by not
making demand for possession.
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E. THE DAMAGES AWARD SHOULD BE REVERSED.
1. Aris Suffered No Damages Because of the Fact the Equipment Remained
on the Premises.
Aris is unable in its brief to point the Court to one piece of evidence demonstrating
that Aris could not have sold the Equipment while it was on the Premises or that the fact
that the Equipment was on the Premises interfered in any way with any sales effort.
Instead, Aris is satisfied to baldly conclude that Wasatch and JDJ "have no basis for
suggesting that Aris could have sold the Equipment while in Wasatch's custody."
[Appellee's Brief at 41] This argument ignores the fact that Aris did in fact sell some of
the Equipment while it was on the Premises and the further fact that Aris reached an
agreement with VISX while the Equipment was on the Premises to take back two of the
lasers. In addition, the argument ignores that it was Aris's burden to demonstrate it
suffered damages because the Equipment remained on the Premises. Aris failed to
shoulder this burden. Aris could have sold the Equipment from the Premises just as
easily as it was later sold from storage.10

10

Wasatch and JDJ raised this argument below by arguing that Aris could not prove any
loss for the period of time the property remained on the Premises and that Aris was not entitled to
any damages during the period in which it was cooperating with Wasatch to keep the Equipment
in place to lure a new tenant [R. 233]; by arguing that Aris was given access to the Premises to
inspect and inventory the Equipment and show the Premises and the Equipment to third parties
any time it requested [R. 172-173]; and by arguing that Soto's testimony that she had potential
buyers for the Equipment was insufficient to prove damages from the fact the Equipment
remained on the Premises because she was unable to name any potential buyers to whom sales
had fallen through based on delay or the loss that Aris had supposedly suffered as a result of any
delay. [R. 293]
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2. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Deprove Depreciation of the Lasers.
Aris trots out once again its familiar refrain that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of depreciation without telling
the court what evidence it is that Wasatch and JDJ have supposedly failed to marshal. In
fact, with one minor irrelevant exception, all of the evidence cited by Aris in its argument
was in fact marshaled.11
Aris has not and cannot explain how it was damaged by depreciation in view of the
fact that the S-3 laser was simply a software upgrade that could be installed on each S-2
laser and that the cost of doing so did not increase during the time the lasers were on the
Premises, or how Aris was damaged in view of the fact that the new technology hit the
market months before Aris vacated the Premises. That lack of proof is fatal to the
depreciation claim.
3. Holdren's Methodology Was Defective.
After erroneously arguing that Wasatch's and JDJ's methodology argument fails
because of a failure to marshal evidence (again not telling the Court what evidence they
supposedly failed to marshal), Aris attempts to support the damage award by arguing that

11

The one exception is that Aris mistakenly argues that Soto testified the depreciation in
the value of the lasers by virtue of the new S-3 software did not occur in 2001 because the
upgrade software was on back order at the time. [Appellee's Brief at 42] However, Soto did not
testify that the fact that the S-3 laser was on back order had any impact at all on when the
depreciation occurred. Soto only testified that the S-3 laser hit the market in the third or fourth
quarter of 2001 and the S-2 started to lose its value. [R. 527 at 243-244]
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Holdren's market data approach was sufficient to support the judgment. [Appellee's Brief
at 43] This argument does not accurately reflect Holdren's testimony.
Holdren testified he used two alternative valuation approaches, an accelerated
depreciation approach and a market data approach. Contrary to Aris's argument, he then
took the average of these two approaches in calculating depreciation. He used the same
flawed methodology of averaging the estimated remaining useful life of all of the
Equipment for both valuation approaches. [R. 526 at 118-122]
Aris also argues that Wasatch and JDJ did not raise an evidentiary objection at
trial. This is not an objection to the admissibility of evidence. Holdren was qualified as
an expert and was free to testify concerning his opinion based upon the methodology he
used.12 However, because his methodology was flawed (which Aris does not contest), the
award of damages cannot stand.
4. Aris Failed to Prove the Amount for Which it Sold the Equipment.
Aris impliedly concedes that it failed to prove the actual price for which it sold
many items of its Equipment. However, Aris is incorrect in arguing that this argument
was not raised at trial. [See, e.g., R 576, 233, 308 & 351]

12

City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001), cited by Aris in
support of its argument, is inapposite. In Cooke, the plaintiff argued that the defendant
landowners were not competent to testify as to the highest and best use of the real property. The
Supreme Court held that the argument that expert testimony was required on this issue had been
properly preserved below. Wasatch and JDJ do not argue that Holdren was incompetent to
testify as an expert.
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Aris also argues that the Court found that Aris could have obtained only $55,000
to $60,000 for the lasers in July 2002. The fact that there was evidence on what Aris
could have obtained for some of the Equipment (this evidence was marshaled in
Appellants' Brief) does not get around the fact that Aris failed to prove the sales price of
all the Equipment. Thus, the damage award cannot stand.13
5. Wasatch and JDJ Are Not Liable for the Missing or Damaged Equipment.
Aris argues that regardless of who took the missing Equipment or who damaged
the damaged Equipment, Wasatch and JDJ are liable for the value of that Equipment
because they did not allow Aris to take it on January 22. [Appellee's Brief at 44-45] The
testimony of Aris's own witnesses disposes of this argument.
Aris's witnesses testified that when Aris vacated the Premises On January 4, 2002,
Aris specifically agreed that the doctors could continue using the Equipment while Aris
attempted to negotiate for the doctors to assume the Lease and purchase the Equipment
and that those negotiations continued until February 15, 2002. [R. 527 at 235-237; R. 527
at 219-220; R. 526 at 153-155] Wasatch and JDJ cannot be held liable for Equipment that
may very well have been taken or damaged by the doctors or the fired employees while
the Equipment was in the doctors' possession with Aris's consent. In fact, Olsen wrote
the doctors' lawyer on April 18, 2002 concerning Aris's recent inventory of "the

13

Aris further argues that the award of damages was based on depreciation, not sales
price. However, obviously, Aris could recover no more than the difference between the value of
the Equipment as of January 22 and the amount for which Aris actually sold the Equipment.
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equipment stored" at the Premises, inquiring if the doctors still had possession of the
missing equipment or if it was in their possession. [Pi's Ex. 23]14

CONCLUSION
The judgment should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of JDJ on its
Counterclaim for damages, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys fees incurred below and
on appeal.
>•&
DATED this fc
day of December, 2004.

BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

STEPHENS. MITCHELL
Attorneys for Appellants

14

Aris is correct that the trial court did not award lost opportunity damages. Wasatch
and JDJ acknowledge their mistake in including a lost opportunity damage argument in their
brief, and hereby withdraw that argument.
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